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KARL LÖWITH AND LEO STRAUSS ON MODERNITY, 
SECULARIZATION, AND NIHILISM
Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss are thinkers who have not been reckoned with to-
gether too frequently. This state of things seems to be the more striking since at 
a fi rst glance they appear to agree on some crucial points regarding the situation of 
the modern man. In this article I will try to explore their respective views on mo-
dernity with a particular emphasis on its political consequences. The fi rst impres-
sion is that both Löwith and Strauss share a negative view of modernity and their 
writings provide a deeply insightful account of that dissatisfaction. But there are 
some other reasons that seem to encourage an attempt to compare their thought 
and life. They came to know each other during the tumultuous Weimar era and to 
some extent followed similar life paths by sharing the fates of émigrés. Given the 
footnotes, reviews and explicit quotations, Strauss and Löwith read each other’s 
works, and maintained lifelong correspondence. It is not a completely negligible 
fact that in a letter from April 28, 1954 to Alexandre Kojève Strauss asked him to 
send a copy of On Tyranny to Karl Löwith saying that he would have an under-
standing of the issue controversial between him and the Frenchman.1
However, one should not forget that in the fi nal analysis Leo Strauss came to 
be seen as a political philosopher who had attempted something very ambitious, 
namely, a thoroughgoing critique of the modern historical malady, the revival of 
classical political philosophy, and establishment of a school of political think-
ing. Compared to that Karl Löwith may seem to be a more restrained and intro-
verted personality. He was a philosopher who may be referred to as a chronicler 
of European nihilism and explorer of continuity and change in modern historical 
consciousness. This difference becomes visible in their respective ways of writ-
ing. Strauss usually disguised his views in the form of dense commentary on 
philosophical texts; however, his moderation was scattered from time to time by 
the outbursts of a truly passionate prose, as in his debate with Alexandre Kojève. 
Löwith preferred a characteristic melancholy style and his mode of proceeding 
1  Leo Strauss, On Tyranny. Revised and Expanded Edition, Victor Gourevitch and 
Michael S. Roth, eds. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 263.
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was perfectly captured by Strauss himself in his review of Löwith’s seminal work 
From Hegel to Nietzsche: “It is written sine ira et studio, without sentimentality 
or vagueness, and with competence and a natural grace. The treatment is narrative 
and meditative rather than disputative or analytical. At times (…) the author (…) 
seems to draw rather than speak.”2 
Before taking a closer view at the picture of modernity they draw it may be 
profi table to recall a few basic historical facts that lie in the background of their 
encounter.3 Strauss was born to an Orthodox Jewish family in a small city in 
northern Germany, but he relatively quickly emancipated himself from the Jew-
ish tradition owing to his Gymnasium education. Löwith was born in Munich 
to a Protestant family of Jewish origin and grew up in a rather well-established 
world of the pre-war bourgeoisie. These different backgrounds seem to account 
for the fact that the problem of Jewish faith and the Jewish fate had always re-
mained a strong presence in Strauss’s thought. Correspondingly, Karl Löwith 
explored the meaning of Protestantism for German philosophy and was even 
mistakenly taken by some readers to be a Protestant theologian. In 1965, in the 
autobiographical Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Strauss wrote that 
he was “a young Jew born and raised in Germany who found himself in the 
grips of the theologico-political predicament.”4 In fact, the theologico-political 
problem had remained his lifelong challenge and may be regarded as the fore-
ground of his concern.5 In turn, Karl Löwith in his account of the situation in 
Germany written in 1940, entitled My Life in Germany Before and After 1933, 
claimed that he had never emphasized his Jewishness before Hitler’s seizure of 
power and perceived himself as a German whose life was based fi rmly and com-
pletely on “emancipation.”6 But regardless of these differences they both had to 
leave Germany when the Nazis came to power. They both witnessed the turmoil 
and upheaval of European civilization, belonging to a generation which had very 
strong feelings of decay, crisis and hitherto unknown demise of belief in almost 
everything that had been previously deemed sacred or indispensible. In other 
words, they belonged to a generation that – in Löwith’s own words – “had been 
cheated of any sign of homecoming.”7 Their confrontation with modernity must 
be seen against the backdrop of the imminent crisis of the European spirit which 
may be labeled as the crisis of modernity. One may rightly say that the experience 
2  Leo Strauss, “Review of Von Hegel bis Nietzsche,” Social Research, 8:4 (Nov. 1941), 
p. 513.
3  I draw the biographical data from Wiebrecht Ries, Karl Löwith (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlers-
che Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1992).
4  Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 224.
5  Heinrich Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, trans. M. Brainard 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 3-28. 
6  Karl Löwith, My Life in Germany Before and After 1933, trans. E. King (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1994), p. 57.
7  Ibid., p. 16.
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of political and cultural upheavals prompted them to undertake the philosophical 
investigation of the basic tenets of the modern world. Both Löwith and Strauss 
approached the problem of modernity by posing and exploring in a profound 
way the problem of its legitimacy. One of the most fundamental questions was 
the question of “whether our task is to push down what is falling, i.e., a dis-
integrating world, or whether it is the more responsible task of reforming and 
renewing our tradition.”8 As we will see, they ultimately decided in favor of the 
latter alternative. One may say that they both experienced a remarkable change 
of philosophical orientation. In case of Leo Strauss that change occurred around 
1932 in the form of his rejection of his previously held “prejudice” that the return 
to pre-modern philosophy is impossible and was accompanied by his rediscovery 
of the art of writing practiced by philosophers of earlier ages.9 In Karl Löwith that 
change of orientation seems to have occurred circa 1935 when he started subject-
ing the “historicist-relativist” point of view to criticism and defending the notion 
of philosophy as a “force of integral knowledge which gives rise to an order of 
human affairs” rather than committing itself to the demands of the time.10    
In 1949, a few years after World War II, Löwith published in Chicago one 
of his most infl uential and discussed books, Meaning in History. The Theologi-
cal Implications of the Philosophy of History (the date of publication coincides 
with Strauss’s Walgreen lectures, published later on as Natural Right and His-
tory), where he advances the so-called secularization thesis. The book’s subtitle 
proved somewhat misleading since Löwith’s main aim lies primarily not in show-
ing the theological implications of history but, on the contrary, the theological 
presuppositions or theological background of modern philosophies of history, 
and our historical consciousness as such. In his study Löwith elaborates the prob-
lem of modernity on the plane of philosophy of history by which he understands 
“a systematic interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by 
which historical events and successions are unifi ed and directed toward an ulti-
  8  Karl Löwith, “Review of ‘What Nietzsche Means’ by George Allen Morgan,” Philo-
sophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 2, no. 2 (Dec. 1941), p. 242.
  9  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, p. 31. Cf. Meier, Leo Strauss and the The-
ologico-Political Problem, pp. 64-65: “The grounds that induced the philosophers to write 
exoteric-esoterically, however, go far beyond political considerations of censorship and perse-
cution. They arise from the insight into the insuperable tension that exists between the political 
community and philosophy. The exoteric-esoteric double-face is the attempt to protect philo-
sophers from society and nonphilosophers from philosophy. It is destined to take account of 
the necessities of politics on the one hand and of the requirements of the philosophical life on 
the other. The art of careful writing is therefore the expression of an equally fundamental and 
comprehensible refl ection on politics, philosophy, and the nature of the philosopher.” 
10  Berthold Riesterer, Karl Löwith’s View of History: A Critical Appraisal of Historicism 
(Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 33-34.
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mate end.”11 His point of departure is the claim that we fi nd ourselves more or less 
at the end of the modern rope which “has worn too thin to give hopeful support.” 
We encounter a situation in which “to ask earnestly the question of the ultimate 
meaning of history takes one’s breath away; it transports us into a vacuum which 
only hope and faith can fi ll.”12 In other words, the ability of the modern phi-
losophy of history to provide a meaningful account of human history has almost 
disappeared. Once a spell-binding and fruitful intellectual endeavor, now phi-
losophy of history loses its credentials in the wake of the dissolution of the belief 
in progress and reason. Löwith tries to explain the current demise of philosophy 
of history as well as the more fundamental problem regarding the very possibility 
of raising the question about the ultimate meaning of history. As he put it, “it is 
the very absence of meaning in the events themselves that motivates the quest.”13 
He claims that philosophy of history is dependent on theology of history, namely 
on the theological concept of history as a history of fulfi llment and salvation. One 
can fi nd the genuine source of philosophy of history in the Jewish and Christian 
faith. In this way he dismisses the prejudice that proper historical thinking begins 
only in modern times. In his study he reverses the historical presentation on the 
assumption that readers belonging to “a generation that is just awakening from 
the secular dream of progress” would have a better understanding of his thesis if 
they were shown the theological background of these trains of thought that are 
not completely unfamiliar, i.e., the belief in progress, and not as distant as the 
religious belief in providence. This explains why he starts from Burckhardt’s 
renunciation of philosophy of history, which is closer to our mode of thinking 
than anything else, and goes back through the ages to the original Biblical story 
of salvation.14 Löwith presents his arguments by contrasting the Greeks and the 
Bible. The Ancients did not look for the ultimate meaning of history; they were 
mesmerized by the beauty of the universe; they were concerned not with the 
Lord of History, but with the logos of the cosmos.15 The Greeks believed in the 
rationality of the natural cosmos that was governed by the cyclical or periodical 
law of growth and decay. According to this law “everything moves within recur-
rences, like the eternal recurrence of sunrise and sunset, of summer and winter, of 
11  Karl Löwith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of History (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 1.
12  Ibid., p. 3.
13  Ibid., p. 4.
14  The “turning points” in Löwith’s book are linked with the names of Marx, Hegel, Com-
te, Voltaire, Bossuet, Vico, Joachim, Augustine, and Orosius.
15  Ibid., p. 6: “To the Greeks (…) historical events and destinies were certainly not simply 
meaningless – they were full of import and sense, but they were not meaningful in the sense 
of being directed toward an ultimate end (…) they supposed that it is possible to foretell the 
future; to the Old Testament writers only the Lord himself could reveal, through his prophets, 
a future which is independent of all that has happened in the past and which cannot be inferred 
from the past as a natural consequence.”
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generation and corruption.”16 This cosmic law set also the pattern for their under-
standing of history and, as Löwith contends, there was no room for the universal 
signifi cance of a unique historical event like the incarnation of God. The eminent 
ancient historians like Thucydides, Herodotus or Polybius were concerned almost 
completely with political history, and – Löwith concludes – “that history, like 
a magnifying mirror reveals also the nature of man, but not as ever-changing, but 
rather constantly the same.”17 The Bible brings about the claim that history has an 
ultimate meaning which transcends the actual historical events; it accounts for the 
setting of eschatology as the basic pattern of Western historical consciousness. 
Thus Löwith contends that the Biblical faith brings into the world something of 
a tremendous importance:
the signifi cance of this vision [history as a story of salvation - AG], as both fi nis and 
telos, is that it provides a scheme of progressive order and meaning, a scheme which 
has been capable of overcoming the ancient fear of fame and fortune. Not only does the 
eschaton delimit the process of history by an end, it also articulates and fulfi lls it by 
a defi nite goal. The bearing of the eschatological thought on the historical conscious-
ness of the Occident is that it conquers the fl ux of historical time, which wastes away 
and devours its own creations unless it is defi ned by an ultimate goal. Comparable to 
the compass which gives us orientation in space, and thus enables us to conquer it, the 
eschatological compass gives orientation in time by pointing to the Kingdom of God as 
the ultimate end and purpose.18 
In other words, the historical process is rendered comprehensible on the 
ground of the theological principle consisting of man’s sin against God and God’s 
willingness to redeem man from the state into which he has fallen.19
Löwith writes that the moderns are neither ancient Ancients nor ancient Chris-
tians, but a mélange of both; we still live on the Christian and classical capital 
16  Ibid. When Löwith refers to the cosmos in the Greek thought he means a specifi c con-
stitution of the natural world, “an orderly totality as distinct from a disorderly, chaotic totality 
of the same beings which, as cosmos, are kata kosmon, cosmos-like” (Karl Löwith, “Heideg-
ger: Problem and Background of Existentialism,” Social Research, 15:1/4, 1948, p. 353). It is 
the notion of an orderly cosmos which was known earlier, but its usage was fi rmly established 
only in Plato’s Timaeus. But one should not forget that there is, to use Rémi Brague’s expres-
sion, “the other Greece,” e.g., Epicureanism which considers the sky not the source of repose 
and order, but the “primary source of terror,” and which confronts Plato with a view of the 
world as a perishable arrangement of atoms that might have been completely different. Plato-
nic “imitation of the world” is thus rendered impossible: “The fact that our world is only one 
exemplar prevents it from being an example.” (Cf. Rémi Brague, The Wisdom of the World. 
The Human Experience of the Universe in Western Thought, trans. T. Lavender Fagan, Chica-
go: The University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 29-43).     
17  Karl Löwith, Permanence and Change. Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Cape 
Town: Haum, 1969), p. 12.
18  Löwith, Meaning in History, p. 18.
19  Ibid., p. 183.
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even if we are reluctant to think of ourselves in those terms. This ambiguity be-
comes perfectly visible in the philosophy of history of Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Oswald Spengler, and Arnold Toynbee. The author of Democracy in America 
perceives the progress democracy has made worldwide as something ordained 
by Providence and yet he believes that this process ought to be moderated by 
human efforts lest it take on dangerous and unwished-for consequences. In Spen-
gler’s view of the declining West the inescapable fate ought to be willed, which 
reminds one about Nietzsche’s amor fati and not necessarily the classical writers. 
And fi nally, Toynbee no longer accepts the Christian reckoning of time and yet 
he tries to secure the claim that Christianity is still the greatest new event in his-
tory as seen from the “astronomical” perspective (i.e., time that has elapsed since 
the world’s beginning). He avers that the movement of civilizations is cyclical, 
but the movement of religion is on a single track that goes continuously upward 
and will end up in establishment of Christianity as the world religion.  Löwith 
dismisses his philosophy as a product of someone who is “neither an empirical 
historian nor good theologian,” and who fell prey to modern naturalistic and sec-
ularized thinking.20 These three examples may serve as an additional illustration 
of Löwith’s secularization thesis which may be summarized as follows:
The Greek historians wrote pragmatic history centered around a great political event; the 
Church Fathers developed from Hebrew prophecy and Christian eschatology a theology of 
history focused on the supra-historical events of creation, incarnation, and consummation; 
the moderns elaborate a philosophy of history by secularizing theological principles and 
applying them to an ever increasing number of empirical facts. It seems as if the two great 
conceptions of antiquity and Christianity, cyclic motion and eschatological direction, have 
exhausted the basic approaches to understanding history.21
It becomes clear that Löwith conceives modernity not in terms of a radical 
break with the preceding tradition; on the contrary, he underlines the persistence 
of the eschatological pattern in shaping our modern consciousness. In this sense 
he denies modernity’s claim to radical autonomy, originality or legitimacy. One 
may wonder whether Löwith’s account of the secularization of the Biblical faith 
does not blur the difference between the Middle Ages and modernity if, regard-
less of all differences, they share the same basic eschatological pattern, even if 
the latter has secularized it. However, this objection is qualifi ed by the fact that 
Löwith’s view of modernity is much more intricate. The already discussed es-
chatological pattern is only one of the essential “components” of modernity. The 
other, which is of utmost importance, refers to the demise of the vision of the 
world as an orderly cosmos as the consequence of the birth of modern natural sci-
ence. In other words, modernity actually begins with “the dissolution of natural 
and social order in which man was supposed to have a defi nite nature and place, 
while modern man ‘exists’, displaced and out of place, in extreme situations on 
20  Ibid., pp. 14-15.
21  Ibid., p. 19.
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the edge of chaos.”22 Philosophers of early modernity, such as Francis Bacon 
and Descartes, declared that the goal of science is to make man the master of 
nature: “the better man succeeded in this the more could the natural science be 
serviceable to man’s historical purposes and projects.”23 Löwith contends that the 
historical movements of modernity owe their intensity to modern natural science: 
“In consequence of this modern tendency to think and act in terms of purposes, 
the quest for meaning has become focused in history, because only as history can 
the world be related directly to man and his purposes.”24 The birth of historicism 
and existentialism is due to the modern scientifi c outlook which, by making the 
earth more “serviceable” to man, bears responsibility for our ever increasing es-
trangement from it. He writes: 
The exclusive emphasis on our human existence and on the world as a historical one has 
a concomitant in the lack of sense for that which is natural. The denaturation of human life 
to a historical existence did not, however, arise with modern historicism and existential-
ism, but with modern natural science. It is against the background of nature as conceived 
by modern natural science that existentialism itself comes into existence, for its basic 
experience is not of historicity but the contingency of human existence within the whole 
of natural world.25
This rise of the experience of “contingency” of man’s being in the world is 
understood by Löwith as the reverse side of the destruction of the vision of an 
orderly cosmos, the experience one can fi nd expressed in the writings of such 
various philosophers and poets as Pascal, John Donne, Kant, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche. In other words, modernity is marked by the demise of the natural 
theology and cosmology of antiquity and supernatural theology of Christianity: 
“If the universe is neither eternal and divine (Aristotle) nor contingent but cre-
ated (Augustine), if man has no defi nite place in the hierarchy of an eternal or 
created cosmos, then, and only then, does man begin to ‘exist’, ecstatically and 
historically.”26 Löwith concludes that there are discernible connections between 
this “cosmological nihilism of modern subjectivity” and the political implications 
of modern thinking. More specifi cally, he focuses on the 19th century process of 
dissolution of the Hegelian philosophy of spirit and the shift in the very notion 
of philosophy which now becomes a “world-view” or “interpretation of life.”27 
Löwith claims that the political consequences of existentialism become visible 
in the proximity between Martin Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy and Carl 
22  Löwith, “Heidegger: Problem and Background of Existentialism,” p. 347. 
23  Karl Löwith, “Nature, History, and Existentialism,” Social Research, 19:1/4 (1952), 
p. 83.
24  Ibid., p. 84.
25  Ibid., p. 88.
26  Löwith, “Nature, History, and Existentialism,” p. 94.
27  Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche. The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought, 
trans. D.E. Green (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 64.
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Schmitt’s political “decisionism.” According to him, Heidegger’s affi rmation of 
the authentic Dasein corresponds to Schmitt’s affi rmation of the political; “free-
dom for death” to “sacrifi ce of life.” He believes that in both cases the principle 
is the same, i.e., naked “facticity” or all that remains when one has disposed of 
all life content.28 And, as we have learnt from Löwith’s narrative of the develop-
ment of Western thought, “there is an intimate relation between the experience of 
a naked, factual, absurd existence, and the anonymity of the world itself in which 
we happen to exist.”29 
Strauss and Löwith agree as to the essential aim of modern natural science. 
Strauss in the Introduction to City and Man expresses a thought that he has advo-
cated in many places, i.e., that the modern project was originated by philosophers 
who viewed nature as something to be conquered for the sake of man and his nat-
ural needs.30 To some extent Strauss acknowledges that it is possible to consider 
modernity in terms of the secularization thesis.31 Nonetheless, he claims that the 
common notion of secularization, i.e., the becoming of what is transcendent and 
other-worldly, immanent and this-worldly, needs to be qualifi ed. First, the secu-
larization thesis attempts to integrate the eternal into a temporal context, so the 
former is no longer understood as eternal. In this way secularization presupposes 
a radical change of thought, and according to him that change occurred primarily 
not within theology itself but came into being with the emergence of modern 
natural and political philosophy or science. In the fi nal analysis secularization is 
an accommodation of theology to that new intellectual climate and it ends up in 
the conceited contention that the providential order can be known to the enlight-
ened men. Strauss claims that:
The theological tradition recognized the mysterious character of Providence especially by 
the fact that God uses or permits evil for his good ends. It asserted, therefore, that man 
cannot take his bearings by God’s providence but only by God’s law, which simply forbids 
man to do evil. In proportion as the providential order came to be regarded as intelligible to 
man, and therefore evil came to be regarded as evidently necessary or useful, the prohibi-
tion against doing evil lost its evidence. Hence various ways of action which were previ-
ously condemned as evil could now be regarded as good. The goals of human action were 
28  Karl Löwith, The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism, in The Heideg-
ger Controversy, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge, Ma.-London, Eng.: The MIT Press, 1993), 
pp. 173-174. Cf. Karl Löwith, “Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von C. Schmitt,” in Karl 
Löwith, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 8, ed. K. Stichweh (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlags-
buchhandlung, 1984), pp. 61-62.    
29  Löwith, “Nature, History, and Existentialism,” p. 89.
30  Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 7. 
31  Cf. Nathan Tarcov, “Preface to the Japanese translation of On Tyranny,” Perspectives 
on Political Science, vol. 33, no. 4 (Fall 2004), p. 225: “Strauss ultimately leaves open the 
question of ‘how far the epoch-making change that was effected by Machiavelli is due to the 
indirect infl uence of the Biblical tradition’ and, therefore, also the question of the truth of 
Kojève’s view that modern philosophy is the secularized form of Christianity.”
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lowered. But it is precisely aalowering of these goals which modern political philosophy 
consciously intended from its very beginning.32
Second, Strauss points out that the secularization thesis may have too general 
a character: “Secularization means the preservation of thoughts, feelings, or hab-
its of biblical origin after the loss or atrophy of biblical faith (…) [It] does not tell 
us anything as to what kind of ingredients are preserved in secularizations.”33 Yet 
modernity, as understood by Strauss, was conceived as a positive project which at 
the same time may be characterized in a most general way as a radical modifi ca-
tion, or rather rejection, of premodern political philosophy. This shortcoming on 
the part of the explanatory force of the secularization thesis prevents Strauss from 
embracing it as the main interpretive tool in his explanation of the origins of mo-
dernity; nevertheless, secularization of the Christian legacy, as we will see, will 
play an important role in Strauss’s explanation of some characteristic features of 
modernity. 
Strauss explains the project of modernity as comprising three waves of mo-
dernity. The fi rst wave began with Machiavelli and was completed by Bacon 
and Hobbes; the second is connected with Rousseau; the third with Nietzsche. 
According to Strauss, the author of the Prince rejected the entire philosophical 
and political tradition by lowering the standards, by taking his bearings not by 
how men ought to live, but how men actually live. Classical political philosophy 
was concerned with the search for the best political order, i.e., the political order 
which gives support to the practice of virtue. Its basic premise is that the good life 
is the life according to nature, and nature is conceived as providing man with the 
standard that is independent of his will. Strauss dismisses the accusation exerted 
by some contemporary thinkers that Plato was a utopist (i.e., in Popper’s The 
Open Society and Its Enemies) with the remark that the classical philosophers 
were perfectly aware that the best city is a city in speech, not in deed; that the 
bringing of the best city into existence is so demanding that it ultimately depends 
on improbably favorable circumstances.34 Machiavelli is more modest but at the 
same time he is more ambitious as well; he claims that chance can be controlled 
32  Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1965), p. 317. According to Hans Blumenberg, “Leibniz’s theodicy characterizes the bad things 
in the world no longer in moral terms but rather in instrumental ones. Leo Strauss saw the ele-
ment of ‘secularization’ precisely in this that not only has providence lost its mysteriousness 
for reason, but at the same time the claim to absoluteness of the divine laws has been overlaid 
by the justifi cation of evil means by the grandeur of the overall end. The Theodicy paves the 
way for the modern concept of history to the extent that it demonstrates the rationality of ab-
solute ends by the model of divine action.” (Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of Modernity, 
trans. R. Wallace, Cambridge, Ma.- London, Eng.: The MIT Press, 1985, p. 55).
33  Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity,” in Political Philosophy. Six Essays, ed. 
Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis-New York: Pegasus-Bobbs-Merill, 1975), p. 83. 
34  Ibid., p. 84: “The establishment of the best regime depends necessarily on uncontrol-
lable, elusive fortuna or chance (…) According to Plato’s Republic, e.g., the coming into being 
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and the human matter transformed. Hence the moral or political problem be-
comes a technical problem, and nature as a standard gets overlaid by the ideal 
of civilization. The conquest of nature is conducted in order to relieve man’s 
estate and to make man’s life easier and safer. In Strauss’s narrative each wave 
of modernity ends up in crisis, and each consecutive wave may be essentially 
understood as a response to the previous crisis, though it always brings about the 
radicalization of modernity. When Machiavelli destroyed the connection between 
politics and natural law, Hobbes restored it in such a way that it no longer ac-
corded with the classical notion of natural law but with the modern theory of the 
state of nature which presents nature not as a standard of good life, but as hostile 
to human wellbeing. Strauss understands Hobbes’s state of nature in which war 
of all against all is a real threat and constant possibility as essentially polemical; 
in other words, the state of nature has been conceived in such a way that men 
cannot help but want to get out of it; they must embark on a civilizing mission 
aimed at establishing a civil state that will let them live relatively peacefully and 
safely under the power of that mortal god Leviathan.35 Hobbes replaces natural 
law, understood in terms of duties and obligations, with the rights of man (e.g., 
the right to self-preservation) which makes him the true founder of liberalism. 
Rousseau’s intention to restore the classical notion of virtue dismissed by Hobbes 
marks the second wave of modernity. However, his attempt failed due to the fact 
that he was unable to extricate himself from the modern concept of the state of 
nature; in Rousseau man’s humanity is a product of the historical process which is 
not teleological; in Strauss’ words, “man becomes human without intending it.”36 
The discovery of history which has taken place between the times of Rousseau 
and Nietzsche is crucial to the third wave of modernity. In the course of the 19th 
century Hegel’s belief in the absolute moment in history became shattered and 
replaced with the belief that the historical process is either unfi nished or unfi nish-
able, though the belief in rationality and progress survived. The thoroughgoing 
critique of rationality and progress is the product of the third wave of modernity, 
namely Nietzsche. He draws the fi nal and radical conclusion that the historical in-
sight uprooted the claim on the part of all known ideals to be grounded in nature, 
God, or reason. Nietzsche teaches us that reason builds upon irrationalities and 
that all hitherto known ideals are merely of human invention.   
Strauss’s stance on modernity may be briefl y summarized as follows. Moder-
nity not only lowers the goal of man and seeks actualization of the best social 
order complying with it, but it promises a universal reconciliation between citi-
of the best regime depends on the coincidence, the unlikely coming together, of philosophy 
and political power.”
35  Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,” in Heinrich Meier, 
Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. The Hidden Dialogue, trans. J.H. Lomax (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 99. 
36  Strauss, “Three Waves of Modernity,” p. 90.
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zens.37 Contrary to the classical thought, modernity presupposes that that there 
are no insurmountable differences between men; in other words, if universal En-
lightenment is possible, the efforts of philosophy and politics can go hand in 
hand. Strauss engaged in the debate with Kojève because he regarded him to be 
exemplary representative of the “modern solution” (i.e., the replacement of the 
moral virtue by universal recognition38). The nature of the modern solution im-
plies that the esoteric-exoteric distinction no longer needs to be upheld.39 The cri-
sis of modernity springs from its unfulfi lled promises; as Strauss put it, “the clas-
sical solution is utopian in the sense that its actualization is improbable” while 
“the modern solution is utopian in the sense that its actualization is impossible.”40 
But there is much more to Strauss’ view of modernity than the three wave 
hypothesis. It is important to add that the Christian legacy plays an important role 
in Strauss’s understanding of the development of Western thought. In contrast to 
Löwith he points towards the difference within so-called Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion by discussing an agreement between the Jewish and Muslim thought on the 
one hand and ancient thought on the other:   
it is not the Bible and the Koran, but perhaps the New Testament, and certainly the Refor-
mation and modern philosophy, which brought about the break with ancient thought. The 
guiding idea upon which the Greeks and the Jews agree is precisely the idea of the divine 
law as a single and total law which is at the same time religious law, civil law, and moral 
37  Robert Pippin, “The Modern World of Leo Strauss,” Political Theory, vol. 20, no. 3 
(Aug., 1992), p. 451: “The ‘ancient’ position by contrast (…) is easy to state: no reconciliation. 
The city or the public world is a permanent cave. Even if the philosopher in the Republic can 
be persuaded (perhaps by the force of the argument that he owes the city a debt) or, paradoxi-
cally, can persuade the many to compel him to return, it is clear that he must rule in the dark. 
He cannot bring the outside light in, and it never seems to enter his mind to attempt to bring 
those inside out (apart from a select few).”   
38  Strauss, On Tyranny, p. 210.
39  David Janssens underlines the importance of the difference between esotericism and 
exotericism for understanding the difference between classical and modern philosophy: “The 
philosopher as such transcends the political realm, as a human being he owes obedience to the 
laws of the polis and respect to its opinions. For this reason, Plato subjects the philosopher to 
the divine law of the best regime, which compels him to devote his wisdom to justice and the 
care of his fellow men. In this way, he exoterically preserves the primacy of justice and coura-
ge, while esoterically crowning wisdom as the highest virtue. We should not forget, however, 
that wisdom is understood here in the Socratic sense, as the awareness of ignorance regarding 
the good and the just. The distinction between an esoteric and an exoteric dimension allows 
Plato to mediate between the political power of opinion and the philosophic pursuit of the 
truth, without detracting from either. In contrast, Hobbes’s radical critique of courage starts 
from a passion that is equally developed in all human beings, and ultimately aims at eradica-
ting the difference between esotericism and exotericism.” (David Janssens, Between Athens 
and Jerusalem. Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics in Leo Strauss’s Early Thought, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2008, p. 162).  
40  Strauss, On Tyranny, p. 210.
Modernity and What Has Been Lost104
law. And it is indeed a Greek philosophy of the divine law which is the basis of the Jewish 
and Muslim philosophy of the Torah or the Shari’a; according to Avicenna, Plato’s Laws 
is the classic work on prophecy and the Shari’a. The prophet occupies in this medieval 
politics the same place the philosopher-kings occupy in Platonic politics: by fulfi lling the 
essential conditions of the philosopher-kings, enumerated by Plato, he founds the perfect 
city, i.e., the ideal Platonic city.41
Strauss claims that Christianity seems to account not only for the “Christiani-
zation” of Plato, but also for the radical character of the modern critique of re-
ligion. On this point both Strauss and Löwith remain in fundamental agreement 
with Nietzsche: modern atheism has little in common with the age-old Epicurean 
motif and is descendant of Biblical morality.42 This new atheism from “intellec-
tual probity” fi ghts religion not because of its allegedly disturbing character but 
because it is a delusion.43      
One may also wonder whether in fact there is in Strauss the fourth wave of 
modernity, which would belong to Heidegger. This seems to be justifi ed at least 
by the importance Strauss gave to Heidegger’s radicalization of modernity, i.e., 
his existentialism.44 Here it suffi ces to remark that Strauss’s appraisal of the sig-
nifi cance of Christian legacy for the modern thought reveals itself again in his 
judgment that Heidegger and the “new thinking” have failed to extricate them-
41  Leo Strauss, “Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi,” 
trans. R. Bartlett, Interpretation, vol. 18, no. 1 (Fall 1990), pp. 4-5.
42  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, p. 29. Cf. Löwith, Meaning in History, p. 7: 
“Nietzsche was right when he said that to look upon nature as if it were a proof of the goodness 
and care of God and to interpret history as a constant testimony to a moral order and purpose 
– that all this is now past because it has conscience against it.” Both Strauss and Löwith refer 
to fragment 357 of Gay Science where Nietzsche says that that what really triumphed over 
the Christian God is Christian morality itself, “the concept of truthfulness that was understood 
ever more rigorously, the father confessor’s refi nement of the Christian conscience, translated 
and sublimated into a scientifi c conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price.” (in The 
Nietzsche Reader, eds. K. A. Pearson, D. Large, Malden-Oxford-Carlton: Blackwell Publis-
hing, 2006, pp. 371-372).
43  According to Leo Strauss this new atheism, contrary to the Epicurean critique of reli-
gion, is bold and active, and it accords with the general outline of the “modern solution:” “Li-
berated from the religious delusion, awakened to sober awareness of his real situation, taught 
by bad experiences that he is threatened by a stingy, hostile nature, man recognizes as his sole 
salvation and duty, not so much ‘to cultivate his garden’ as in the fi rst place to plant a garden 
by making himself the master and owner of nature. But this whole enterprise requires, above 
all, political action, revolution” (Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, p. 29).
44  Cf. Leo Strauss, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” in Leo Strauss, The 
Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1989).
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selves from the Christian presuppositions and represent awareness that is in the 
fundamental sense “a secularized version of the Biblical faith.”45
All differences regarding the understanding of the origins of modernity aside, 
both Strauss and Löwith conclude that modernity ended up in crisis which proper 
name seems to be nihilism. While Löwith speaks about existence in existentialist 
ontology as “blind and deaf to any light that does not burn in its own sphere and 
to any voice that does not sound from itself,” existence that is “a cave-dweller 
who knows neither Platonic sun nor the Christian regeneration, nor the Jewish 
waiting till the day of redemption,”46 Strauss goes even further and employs the 
highly suggestive picture of the “second cave” with regard to modernity in gen-
eral. Strauss’s attempt to reopen the quarrel between the Ancients and the Mod-
erns, as well as his defense of the claims of Revelation against the assault of 
modern rationalism (i.e., his critique of Spinoza’s refutation of the Revelation), 
and rejuvenation of the notion of natural right may be seen in the light of his task 
to undermine the predominant historical consciousness of our times and return 
to philosophy in its original Socratic sense. As he refl ected, “philosophy in the 
original meaning of the word presupposes the liberation from historicism (…) 
liberation from it, and not merely refutation (…) the liberation from historicism 
requires that historical consciousness be seen to be, not a self-evident premise, 
but a problem.”47 In turn, Löwith describes his efforts as a correction of our ob-
session with temporality or history and its vicissitudes.48 He wants to regain an 
attitude toward the world that is theoretical in the classical sense, i.e., free of 
historical consciousness and elevated above practice and pragmatic restrictions.49 
This attitude is less anthropocentric since, as he reminded us, the world and the 
human world are not equivalent; one can imagine the natural world without a ref-
erence to man, but man cannot be imagined without the existence of the world: 
45  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, pp. 12-13:  “Heidegger wishes to expel from 
philosophy the last relics of Christian theology like the notions of ‘eternal truths’ and ‘the 
idealized absolute subject.’ But the understanding of man which he opposes to the Greek 
understanding of man as the rational animal is, as he emphasizes, primarily the Biblical un-
derstanding of man as created in the image of God. Accordingly, he interprets human life in 
the light of ‘being towards death,’ ‘anguish,’ ‘conscience,’ and ‘guilt’; in this most important 
respect he is much more Christian than Nietzsche.” Cf. Karl Löwith, “Heidegger: Thinker in 
a Destitute Time,” in Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger. European Nihilism, ed. Richard Wolin, 
trans. G. Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 116. 
46  Karl Löwith, “M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig or Temporality and Eternity,” Philo-
sophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 3, no. 1 (Sep., 1942), pp. 60-61.
47  Leo Strauss, “Living Issues of German Postwar Philosophy,” in Meier, Leo Strauss and 
the Theologico-Political Problem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 133.
48  K. Löwith, Permanence and Change, p. 8.
49  Jürgen Habermas, “Karl Löwith: Stoic Retreat from Historical Consciousness,” in 
Philosophical-Political Profi les (Cambridge, Ma.-London, Eng.: The MIT Press, 1990), p. 84.
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“We come into the world – he does not come to us – and we separate from it while 
he outlives us.”50
The recognition of the crisis of modernity led them to refl ect on whether there 
might be any possibility of return. For Strauss the problem of return is ambigu-
ous at the very outset since the Western tradition consists of the two major ele-
ments that oppose each other: the Bible and Greek philosophy, Jerusalem and 
Athens. This disagreement, this battle for minds and hearts has been increasingly 
neglected though it is the crucial element of the vitality of the Western civiliza-
tion. In turn, for Löwith the problem of return emerged above all in the form of 
two interpretations of nihilism delivered by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.51 Their 
philosophies may be understood as returns – the former as the return to the un-
corrupted purity of early Christianity, and the latter as the return to the ancient 
vision of the cosmos in the form of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the 
same. They shared the insight that men need eternity in order to withstand the 
fl ux of time and aimed to restore the right place to eternity, which has come into 
oblivion52. Kierkegaard’s “eternal instant” and Nietzsche’s paradox of “the eter-
nal recurrence” are the means by which they attempted in a distinctly different 
ways at the overcoming of nihilism. But while for the Danish philosopher nihil-
ism is the product of our estrangement from the ideals of the fi rst Christians, for 
the German philosopher it is the consequence of our being Christians for two 
millennia. Löwith was deeply concerned with both authors in his writings; how-
ever, he had chosen Nietzsche as one of his major themes because he seemed to 
be a touchstone of the present and at the same time the sharpest negation of his 
own time. “In contrast to this timely or untimely use” Löwith “tried to establish 
the idea of eternity as the central focus of his philosophy.”53 Löwith’s book on 
Nietzsche published in 1935 as Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkunft 
des Gleichen was acclaimed by Strauss himself; in one of his letters to Löwith he 
acknowledges his debt to his book by saying that it enabled him to understand the 
relation between nihilism and the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same.54 
Nietzsche seems to have formulated at the early age the key alternative which he 
reiterated during his life and expressed it in words that sound both beautiful and 
dramatic: “Thus man outgrows everything that once embraced him; he has no 
need to break the shackles – they fall away unforeseen when a god commands 
50  Karl Löwith, “Mensch und Geschichte,” in Karl Löwith, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 2, 
eds. K. Stichweh and M.B. de Launay (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1983),  p. 346. 
51  Karl Löwith, “Kierkegaard und Nietzsche oder philosophische und theologische 
Überwindung des Nihilismus,” in Löwith, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 6 (Stuttgart: J.B. Met-
zlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1987), pp. 53-74.
52  Löwith, “M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig or Temporality and Eternity,” p. 77.
53  Löwith, My Life in Germany Before and After 1933, p. 83.
54  Leo Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, eds. Heinrich Meier, Wiebke Meier (Stutt-
gart-Weimar: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2008), p. 648.
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them; and where is the ring that in the end still encircles him? Is it the world? Is it 
God?”55 Löwith sees in Nietzsche’s decision in favor of the latter the most crucial 
part of his thought. According to him Nietzsche’s attempt is “the attempt to tie 
the existence of modern man, which has become eccentric, back into the natural 
whole of the world.”56 Though sympathetic to Nietzsche’s goal, Löwith claims 
that his attempt failed. The reason is that Nietzsche was too modern and thus un-
able to free himself from not only modern presuppositions and a way of feeling, 
but the Christian one as well. It may be said that he attempted something great, 
i.e., he attempted to re-marry the modern man to the ancient vision of the world 
at the peak of modernity. Yet the means at his disposal in the 19th century could 
not be other than the means of the post-Copernican world. In this historical situ-
ation the age-old idea of the eternal recurrence of the same remerged in a deeply 
fl awed modernized form. According to Löwith, Nietzsche sang his song to the 
“innocence” of existence with a broken voice because he sang it on the ground of 
Christian experience:57 
For the Greek understanding of man, being a man means in effect being a ‘mortal,’ where-
as Nietzsche wanted to ‘eternalize’ the fl eeting existence of fi nite man. For the Greeks the 
eternal recurrence of emergence and decline explained the constant change in nature and 
history; for Nietzsche the recognition of an eternal recurrence demands an extreme and 
ecstatic point of view. The Greeks felt fear and reverence before inexorable fate; Nietzsche 
made the superhuman effort to will and to love fate (…). Nothing else is so striking in 
Nietzsche’s thought as the emphasis on our creative essence, creative through the act of 
will, as with the God of the Old Testament. (…) Nietzsche lived and thought to the end 
the metamorphosis of the biblical ‘Thou shalt’ into the modern ‘I will,’ but he did not ac-
complish the decisive step from the ‘I will’ to the ‘I am’ of the cosmic child of the world, 
which is innocence and forgetting. As a modern man, he was so hopelessly separated from 
an original ‘loyalty to the earth’ and from the feeling of an eternal security under the vault 
of heaven, that his effort to ‘translate’ man ‘back’ into nature was condemned to failure 
from the outset. His teaching breaks apart into two pieces because the will to eternalize the 
existence of the modern ego (an existence it is thrown into) does not harmonize with the 
beholding of an eternal cycle of the natural world.58
In Nietzsche’s defi nition of nihilism (“since Copernicus man rolls from the 
center toward an unknown place X”) Löwith found the compelling expression 
of his own concern with the demise of cosmological thought. In turn, Strauss 
employs the term nihilism in different contexts, but it seems plausible to speak 
about its two major applications. The fi rst one is connected with the three waves 
55  Friedrich Nietzsche, “Mein Leben,” in Werke in drei Bänden, vol. 3 (Munich: Carl 
Hauser Verlag, 1954), p. 110.
56  Karl Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. 
J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: The University of California Press, 1997), 
p. 94.
57  Ibid., p. 120.
58  Ibid., p. 121.
of modernity, or their outcome – historical malady, relativism, and the crisis of 
political philosophy, i.e., the situation of the modern individual who knows only 
the Weberian wars between rivaling gods or ideals. The second use is developed 
by Strauss in his text on German nihilism where he says that “nihilism is the 
rejection of the principles of civilization as such.”59 Strauss conceives German 
nihilism in terms of a protest against the ideal of modern civilization we have 
learnt while discussing the origins of modernity. In this view nihilism is born 
out of a moral protest at the root of which one can fi nd the hatred for the vision 
of the world in which everyone would be satisfi ed and pacifi ed; in other words, 
against the world which permits no place for seriousness. The basic demands of 
the moral life are connected with the so-called closed society, i.e., society that is 
permanently confronted with the possibility of Ernstfall or war, with seriousness 
as such. Strauss claims that this very passion or conviction is not contemptible 
in itself, although it took on the basest form of nihilism known as the National 
Socialism. It would not be a misappropriation were we to defend the view that 
Strauss remained favorably disposed to that conviction; one of the most visible 
places where he dwells on this “conviction” is his passionate debate with Alex-
andre Kojève. He launched a powerful attack on what came to be known as the 
universal and homogenous state using arguments familiar to that of young “Ger-
man nihilists:”
If the universal and homogenous state is the goal of History, History is absolutely ‘tragic’ 
(…) For centuries and centuries men have unconsciously done nothing but work their way 
through infi nite labors and struggles and agonies, yet ever again catching hope, toward 
the universal and homogenous state, and as soon as they have arrived at the end of their 
journey, they realize that through arriving at it they have destroyed they humanity and 
thus returned, as in a cycle, to the prehuman beginnings of History. Vanitas vanitatum. 
Recognitio recognitionum.60 
Strauss wonders whether the nihilistic revolt against the universal and homo-
geneous state may not be the only possible action on behalf of man’s humanity, 
even if it will lead to the repetition of the entire historical process “from the horde 
to the fi nal state.” That kind of “new lease on life” is for Strauss more prefer-
able than the “indefi nite continuation of the inhuman end.” After all, Strauss asks 
rather rhetorically, “Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of 
the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?”61
Coming to the conclusion: At the beginning of these remarks it was said that 
Strauss regarded Löwith as someone with whom he shared understanding of some 
most important issues, e.g., the problem of the universal and homogeneous state. 
Having briefl y compared their views on modernity one can understand that there 
59  Leo Strauss, “German Nihilism,” eds. David Janssens and Daniel Tanguay, Interpreta-
tion, 29:3 (Spring 1999), p. 364.
60  Strauss, On Tyranny, pp. 208-209.
61  Ibid., p. 209.
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are insights in their thoughts that seem to draw their refl ection upon modernity 
close to each other. This proximity becomes particularly visible in their rejection 
of the universal and homogenous state. However, the ground of that rejection is 
slightly different. Strauss rejects it in the name of a truly human life which has 
become increasingly endangered by the tyranny of universality and homogeneity. 
One may say that his rejection is based primarily on his adherence to the ideal of 
a morally serious political community, which he found formulated most compel-
lingly in the writings of the ancient political philosophers, and embodied in the 
life of Greek polis.62 Löwith’s rejection would not be apolitical, but rather “trans-
political.” His adherence to the ideal of being loyal to the earth or being citizens 
of the world rather than of the universal and homogeneous state seems to be of 
Stoic origin albeit blended with Nietzschean attempts. In this way he reminds us 
about the perspective that transcends both the small political community and the 
inhuman community of universal and homogenous state. In our times, when the 
seriousness of life and the very prospects of life on earth are at stake, Strauss’ and 
Löwith’s perspectives seem to be all the more worthy of consideration.
62  Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 662.
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